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MYTH, REALITY PAST AND PRESENT, 
AND JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
Roy A. SCHOTLAND· 
[T]here are particular moments in public affairs when the people ... 
[are] misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men .... What 
bitter anguish would not the people of Athens have often escaped iftheir 
government had contained so provident a safeguard against the tyranny 
of their own passions? Popular liberty might then have escaped the 
indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens the hemlock on one 
day and statues on the next. I 
The republican principle . . . does not require an unqualified 
complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient 
impulse which the people may receive from the arts of men, who flatter 
their prejudices to betray their interests.2 
Why do we have judicial elections? A democracy without elections for the 
legislature and executive (or, in parliamentary systems, for the executive as the 
leadership of the elected legislators), would be simply inconceivable. But no one 
would deny that eleven of our states, or many other nations, are democracies 
even though they do not electjudges.3 
It might follow from that irrefutable, fundamental difference between 
elections for judges and for other offices, that judicial elections should not-or 
more to the point, need not-be conducted the same as other elections. Before 
we soar into debate, let us lay a foundation with elements of fact: first, the 
historical facts about why we have judicial elections; second, how well or poorly 
those facts-that is, the very purpose of having judicial elections-have been 
taken into account by the courts that have stricken efforts to treat judicial 
elections differently. 
I. THE HISTORICAL FACTS 
Given that judicial elections are not a sine qua non of democracy, it is not 
surprising that they were chosen not simply to increase popular control, but to 
free the judiciary from domination by the other branches, and to enhance the 
• Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. This Paper was prepared specifically 
for the Symposium on Judicial Campaign Conduct and the First Amendment. The views expressed 
in this Paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the 
National Center for State Courts, the Joyce Foundation, or the Open Society Institute. Supported 
(in part) by a grant from the Program on Law & Society of the Open Society Institute, as well as 
a grant from the Joyce Foundation. 
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 63 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
3. In seven states, no judges face elections (Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Virginia); in four, probate and/or family court judges 
are elected (Connecticut, Maine, South Carolina, and Vermont). 
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caliber of the bench and the profession. However, rather than being controlled 
by a populist movement at the constitutional conventions, the issue of judicial 
elections was controlled by moderate lawyer delegates. Their move for judicial 
elections was by no means an effort to make the judiciary like the other branches, 
but instead, an effort to elevate the judiciary and make it more independent of 
other branches so that it could better render justice. 
To infer from the decision to have elections that with that choice came an 
abandonment of the role and function of the judiciary is sheer error. The Seventh 
Circuit has memorably corrected that error: 
Two principles are in conflict and must, to the extent possible, be 
reconciled. Candidates for public office should be free to express their 
views on all matters of interest to the electorate. Judges should decide 
cases in accordance with law rather than with any express or implied 
commitments that they may have made to their campaign supporters or 
to others. The roots of both principles lie deep in our constitutional 
heritage. Justice under law is as fundamental a part of the Western 
political tradition as democratic self-government and is historically more 
deeply rooted, having been essentially uncontested within the 
mainstream of the tradition since at least Cicero's time. Whatever their 
respective pedigrees, only a fanatic would suppose that one of the 
principles should give way completely to the other-that the principle 
of freedom of speech should be held to entitle a candidate for judicial 
office to promise to vote for one side or another in a particular case or 
class of cases or that the principle of impartial legal justice should be 
held to prevent a candidate for such office from furnishing any 
information or opinion to the electorate beyond his name, rank, and 
serial number.· We do not understand the plaintiffs to be arguing that 
because Illinois has decided to make judicial office mainly elective 
rather than (as in the federal system) wholly appointive, it has in effect 
redefined judges as legislators or executive-branch officials.4 
4. Buckley v. III. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 227-28 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding the 
Illinois limitation overbroad). Judge Posner went on to note the danger of "bringing the case 
within the orbit of Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982)," id. at 228, the ill-fitting case that, as 
Professor O'Neil stresses in his Paper, so many courts have so unthinkingly applied to judicial 
election problems. See generally Robert M. O'Neil, The Canons in the Courts: Recent First 
Amendment Rulings, 35 IND. L. REv. 701 (2002). 
Posner added this: 
Judges remain different from legislators and executive officials, even when all are 
elected, in ways that bear on the strength of the state's interest in restricting their 
freedom of speech. Further we need not go since the plaintiffs do not argue that the 
State of Illinois is constitutionally prohibited from placing greater restrictions on the 
campaign utterances of judicial candidates than on the campaign utterances of 
candidates for other types of public office. 
Buckley, 997 F.2d at 228. 
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On the history, for brevity I quote directly from the leading source, which has 
held up unaltered by later treatments. 
By 1860, twenty-one of our thirty States elected judges. Since 1846, twenty-
one states had constitutional conventions, nineteen of which chose elections, with 
only Massachusetts and New Hampshire holding out.s 
Scholars have given two explanations of the move to elections. First, "that 
emotion prevailed over reason ... an unthinking 'emotional response' rooted in 
... Jacksonian Democracy. This view assumed that popular election of judges 
constituted a radical measure intended to break judicial power through an 
infusion of popular will and majority control.,>(j Second, that "[p]olitical 'outs' 
maneuvered to strip partisan opponents of valuable patronage.,,7 But in fact, 
Hall's research into the constitutional convention histories found that, "delegates 
from across the ideological spectrum criticized the party-directed distribution of 
these offices whether by the executive or the legislative branch. . .. Moderates 
... reflected the belief of many ... writers that partisanship could never be 
eliminated, [but they believed] it could be controlled."s 
Hall further explains: 
[Scholars have] ignore[d] the overwhelming role oflawyer-delegates in 
the conventions. In every convention, lawyers and judges of both parties, 
for whom the method of judicial selection had personal and professional 
significance, controlled the committees on the judiciary. They also 
dominated debate over the issue once it reached the full 
conventions. . .. In only five conventions did the issue of popular 
election prove sufficiently controversial to require a roll-call vote before 
adoption .... Moderates ... promoted consensus within the conventions 
through innovative arguments that stressed the positive effects of 
popular election on the exercise of judicial power. At the same time, they 
calmed conservative fears by developing constitutional devices that 
blunted the full impact of popular will on the judiciary. 
Moderates were more than conciliators of ideological opponents. 
Rather, these lawyer-delegates had a positive agenda .... This agenda 
included a more efficient administration of justice, an increase in the 
status of the bench and bar, an end to the penetration of partisan politics 
into the selection process, and increased independence and power for 
appellate and, to a lesser extent, for trial court judges. 
A breakdown in the administration of justice in the appellate and 
inferior courts lent urgency to the constitutional reform movement. ... 
In the late 1840s litigants appealing civil cases to the Indiana Supreme 
Court often suffered delays of four years before the court could hear 
5. Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform and the Rise of an 
Elected Judiciary, 45 THE HISTORIAN 337, 337-38 (1983). 
6. ld. at 338-39. 
7. ld. at 339. 
8. Id. at 346-47. 
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their suits .... 
Moderates claimed that popular election complemented proposals to 
restructure the courts [and would also bring] a centralized judicial 
structure and reduction in costs of court administration [and] a means of 
stimulating greater productivity on the bench .... Moderates concluded 
that the profession had nothing to lose and everything to gain by greater 
openness in the selection process. Popular election would both enhance 
the prestige of the legal profession and make the bench more receptive 
to the demands ofthe legal profession for a simpler scheme of justice. 
Moderates insisted that popularly elected judges were more likely than 
appointed judges to implement reforms in pleading and 
procedure-reforms that moderate lawyers viewed as essential to the 
future ofthe profession. As ... Bishop Perkins of New York explained 
to his fellow lawyers, appointed judges too frequently were "mere legal 
monks, always poring over cases and antique tomes of learning." 
Moderates, therefore, endorsed popular election as a means to an able, 
respected, and enlightened judiciary. This, in tum, promised wider 
respect for the legal profession, ... "The judiciary are so weak," Abner 
Keyes informed the Massachusetts convention, because "they must 
depend on the legislative branch for their appointments and to make the 
laws. Elect your judges," Keyes continued, "and you will energize them, 
and make them independent; and put them on a par with the other 
branches of government." Moderates echoed these conc lusions in New 
York, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio, Maryland, and Virginia .... 
Moderates built consensus among delegates by adopting 
constitutional devices that limited the potentially disruptive 
consequences of popular election. They made elected judges ineligible 
for other offices during the term for which they were elected, required 
staggered elections of appellate judges, [and] provided that appellate 
judges be elected in circuits or districts rather than in at-large state 
elections .... By making judges ineligible for other offices, moderates 
prevented sitting judges from using their decision-making powers to 
campaign for other posts. Staggered terms, as one Indiana delegate 
observed, ensured that there could be no "revolution in law based on 
party feeiing." ... Moderates also resisted radical demands for short 
terms of office for appeals court judges. They argued successfully that 
lawyers of ability would resist appellate court service if the terms were 
too short.9 
The last note is a major one: the whole goal of judicial selection is to find 
ways to make it more likely that "lawyers of ability" and, as we would add today, 
of appropriate temperament, will seek to serve on the bench. 
9. Id. at 342-47, 350, 352 (citations omitted). 
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II. "AN ELECTION Is AN ELECTION Is AN ELECTION": THE MANTRA 
THAT PASSED FOR ANAL YSI.S IN THE DECISIONS LIMITING CANON PROVISIONS 
In ACLU v. Florida Bar, the court stated, 
. [W]hen a state decides that its trial judges are to be popularly elected, as 
Florida has done, it must recognize the candidates' right to make 
campaign speeches and the concomitant right of the public to be 
informed about the judicial candidates . 
. . . [I]n a different yet related context [the only other context this judge 
noted], many states once imposed a complete ban on attorney advertising 
... To be sure, this case is different from the attorney advertising cases. 
Nonetheless, the lessons to be learned from those cases can provide 
some insight here. . . . [H]ere, as in the advertising arena, the state 
underestimates the ability of the public to place the information in its 
proper perspective. 10 
The ACLU v. Florida Bar judge saw only a single "compelling state 
interest," which it described as ''the maintenance of public confidence in the 
objectivity of its judiciary.,,1 1 
F our days after that decision (by coincidence), the Ninth Circuit en bane held 
that California could not ban political party endorsements for nonpartisan judicial 
candidates in a county's official voter pamphlet. 12 Judge Reinhardt, in a separate 
concurrence joined by Judge Kozinski, said this: 
True, [justices campaigning for retention] could have kept 
silent-but if the people of the state want elections for judges, they must 
also want a fair and full debate on the issues .... The State of California 
cannot have it both ways. If it wants to elect its judges, it cannot deprive 
its citizens of a full and robust election debate. It cannot forbid speech 
by persons or groups who wish to make their views, support, or 
endorsements known .... If the people are to be given the right to choose 
their judges directly, they are free, rightly or wrongly, to consider the 
political philosophy of the candidates. They are even free, rightly or 
wrongly, to consider how the candidates may vote on important issues 
of public concern, such as abortion, capital punishment, affirmative 
action, gun control, and religious freedom, to name just a few. One 
would have to be exceedingly naive not to be aware that a judge's 
judicial philosophy may influence his or her votes on important public 
issues that come before the court, particularly the state or federal 
supreme court. Whether ajudicial candidate wishes to make his views 
known on those issues during the electoral process is another matter. So 
is the question whether it is proper for him to do so. But those are all 
10. ACLU v. Fla. Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094, 1097·99 (D. Fla. 1990) (emphasis in original). 
11. Id. at 1097. 
12. Geary v. Renne, 911 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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problems inherent in California's decision to conduct judicial elections. 
If California wishes to elect its judges, it must allow free speech to 
prevail in the election process .... 
Of course, the citizens of California have a choice .... California 
could, like the federal government, provide for the appointment of 
judges for life-at some or all levels of its judiciary. \3 
Six months later, the Supreme Court of Kentucky directly followed the ruling 
from ACLU and found that one of its state judicial canons contained unduly 
broad speech limits.14 
Four months after Kentucky's J.C.D.C. decision, the Ninth Circuit was 
followed flatly by a federal district court-this time, to strike a limit on campaign 
advocacy on disputed legal or political issues, including a candidate's 
"philosophical views on criminal sentencing and the rights of victims of crime 
[and] how he would apply [the 'reasonable doubt'] standard .... "IS The Third 
Circuit reversed the lower court's decision, including the following 
point-notable because it is so unusual: "The fact that a state chooses to select 
its judges by popular election, while perhaps a decision of questionable wisdom, 
does not signify the abandonment of the ideal of an impartial judiciary carrying 
out its duties fairly and thoroughly.,,16 
By 1997, Kentucky's canon had been revised and its supreme court revisited 
the matter in Summe v. Judicial Retirement and Removal Commission, J7 dealing 
with an interesting example of''the artful misrepresentation of interested" people 
and upholding a finding of misreprentation. 18 The candidate being disciplined 
had distributed over 5000 copies ofthe "Kenton County Citizen's Courier," with 
an "article" about child abuse and a "letter to the editor" noting the candidate's 
concern about crime. 19 However, the "Citizen's Courier" was a campaign flyer, 
not a newspaper. The newspaper format was "commonly used in elections in 
Kenton County,,2°-but unlike the use in Summe, was always clearly marked as 
campaign material, and had not been used in judicial campaigns. 
Dissenting from disciplining the candidate, one judge perfectly put forward 
the simplistic approach: 
[This candidate] entered the rough and tumble world of Kentucky 
electoral politics and was successful in unseating a recently 
gubernatorially appointed incumbent circuit judge .... She ran a good 
campaign against a tough opponent and was popularly elected by the 
13. Id. at 291·96. 
14. J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953,956 (Ky. 1991). 
15. Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court, 763 F. Supp. 128, 131 (E.D. Pa.), 
rev'd, 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991). 
16. Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 1991). 
17. 947S.W.2d42(Ky.1997). 
18. Id. at 48. 
19. Id. at 44. 
20. Id. at 45. 
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Kenton County voters. In Kentucky, both the law and tradition allow 
judicial candidates, like all other candidates in political elections, to be 
guided by the rules of the Marquis de Sade as long as they tell the truth. 
Idealists would restrict judicial candidates to the rules of the Marquis de 
Queensbury.21 
Just last year, a Pennsylvania court stated: 
Finally, we believe it is important to point out that the people of 
. Pennsylvania have provided that we shall elect our judges,just as we do 
our legislators and executives. While it is true that in some 
circumstances we hold our judges to different-and often more 
exacting-standards than we do other public officials, we have chosen 
a method of judicial selection which takes place in the arena in which the 
First Amendment affords its broadest protection. That a candidate seeks 
judicial office does not diminish the nature or scope ofthat protection. 
Any difference between the offices sought bears only on the nature of 
the state's interest, in regulating a candidate's speech. To hold 
otherwise would open the floodgates for the electoral decisions of our 
citizens to be tarnished .... 22 
Finally, earlier this year, Judge Beam, dissenting from the Eighth Circuit's 
decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly upholding Minnesota's 
choice of nonpartisan judicial elections, stated: "[S]ince [it was] first perm itted 
to select. its own judiciary, Minnesota has consistently favored electorally-
responsive judges.'023 Later in that opinion, the concern for judicial 
independence, and the recognition that "rightly so, ... judges fundamentally 
differ from other elected officials," were both dismissed as "policy notions [sic]" 
that "cannot trump constitutionally-enshrined rights.',24 
Due process was not mentioned at all. But this is so plainly "a case where 
constitutionally protected interests lie on both sides of the legal equation," as 
Justice Breyer recently said.2s Referring to constitutional "rights," without even 
mentioning due process, is stunning shallowness. 
CONCLUSION 
To treat a judicial election the same or essentially the same as other 
elections, is to ignore a number of vital and important factors. 
First, the due process rights of litigants to impartial, open-minded judges, and 
the public's right to have ajudiciary able to render justice is imperative. Second, 
21. Id. at 48-49. 
22. In re Miller, 759 A.2d 455, 470-71 (Pa. Court of Judicial Discipline 2000). 
23. RepUblican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 890 (8th Cir.) (Beam, 1., dissenting), 
cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 643 (2001). 
24. Id. at 891. 
25. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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as Robert Bauer brings out,26 the public has a right to have judges function 
differently from other elected officials in order to preserve the role of the 
judiciary in our system of checks and balances. Third, the history of why we 
chose to have judicial elections did not include any disregard for, let alone 
readiness to undermine, the core values of a system of checks and balances. 
Rather, the purpose of having judicial elections was intended to secure 
independence for the judiciary, to insulate the judiciary from partisan politics and 
control, to improve the judges' performance and administration, ~nd thus, to 
elevate the bench, the profession, and public confidence in the judicial system. 
Those purposes ate the reasons for state constitutional provisions unique to the 
judiciary on length of terms, protection against reduction in pay, limits on 
running for other offices, how vacancies are filled, and disciplinary processes. 
Finally, it is not only the speech of judicial candidates that we have, for 
decades, treated in ways that would be inconceivable in other elections. For 
example, in all but four of the thirty-nine states with judicial elections, a legally 
binding canon bars personal fundraising and requires that all fundraising be done 
by the candidate's campaign committee in order to at least reduce the candidate's 
involvement in fundraising.27 Can you imagine similarly limiting candidates in 
other elections? Likewise, in at least twenty-four states, the law limits the time 
period during which fundraising is permitted, both before and after the election. 28 
Again, such limits would be unimaginable for other elections, except possibly for 
barring legislators from raising funds during legislature sessions. 
Therefore, in almost every state with judicial elections, campaigning has 
been subject to special treatment for decades. 
Our Symposium cannot overlook how easy it is to draw a line to separate the 
"election-related activities" of judicial candidates from their other activities, 
compared to trying to draw any such line for, say, legislative candidates.29 
26. Robert F. Bauer, Thoughts on the Democratic Basis for Restrictions on Judicial 
Campaign Speech, 35 IND. L. REV. 747 (2002). 
27. The four states are California, Idaho, Nevada, and Texas. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
REpORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYER'S POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS, 
PART Two, at41 n.73 (1998). 
28. The pre-election window is one year in five states and shorter in eleven states, and the 
post-election window is six months or shortet in nineteen states. Id. at 48 n.82. Once again, a 
Florida federal judge stands alone, striking such a limitation as contrary to the First Amendment 
rights of candidates to solicit, of supporters to associate, and of voters to receive information. See 
Zeller v. Fla. Bar, 909 F. Supp. 1518 (N.D. Fla. 1995). For a contrary decision which Zeller found 
iII-considered, see In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 627 S. W.2d I (Ark. 1982). See also AMERICAN 
BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 27, at 48 n.83. 
Id. 
The Task Force is unanimous that the widespread adoption oftiming limits like Canon 
5 reflects a sound balancing between the need to mount campaigns and the need to 
protect public confidence in the courts. We believe that the Zeller view enlarges all the 
worst aspects of judicial campaign fundraising .... 
29. Cf Richard BrifTault, Issue Advocacy: RedraWing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. 
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Communication between nonjudicial candidates and the public occurs, during 
campaigns and all the rest of the time, via the same media and messages. 
Communication to or fromjudges-except during campaigns~ccurs in highly 
structured and controlled ways-in trials and hearings, via evidence, testimony, 
arguments, and briefs. True, judges also write articles, give lectures, appear on 
panels, etc. But judges' communications outside the courtroom--ex~ept during 
campaigns-are almost entirely free ofthe self-pronlotion and kinds of advocacy 
that is garden-variety when other elected officials address the pUblic. 
However, during campaigns, judges and judicial candidates face the same 
incentives as other candidates: they want 'to win. For judges, facing such 
incentives means departing from the modes of communication with which they 
are familiar and entering into a new domain-in which many of them feel acute 
discomfort, and into which they are led more and more often by campaign 
consultants whose sole incentive is to win. 
I urge great care before we cut down the safeguards that have surrounded 
judicial elections. The safeguards should remain notto reduce accountability or 
out of paternalism, but to protect the constitutional rights of litigants and-as 
Robert Bauer adds invaluably-our courts' unique function in our system of 
checks and balances.3o 
Isn't the danger, indeed the strong prob!lbility, that the more judicial 
elections are like other elections, the more we will lose people who would be 
excellent judges but who view the need for intense campaigning as a severe 
hurd Ie? And isn't the whole purpose of judicial selection getting onto the bench 
the people most suited to be judges? 
L. REv. 1751, 1768 (1999) (examining campaign finance concerns and free speech issues in the 
context ofiegis\ative campaigns). 
30. See Bauer, supra note 26. 
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